ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

endorsed by J. P. Kridler, and also purporting to be endorsed by
Henry Shirk; and if they further find that the names of Edward
Dunn and Henry Shirk, as drawer and endorser of said note, were
forgeries, that then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such sum
as they may find was paid by them to the defendant for said paper,
notwithstanding they may find that the defendant acted as an agent
in said sale, unless they also find that the defendant at the time
of such sale disclosed the name of the person or persons for whom
he acted as agent in such transaction.
A verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs.
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Supreme Court of Pennstllvania, January, 1856.
Amendment- Judgment on 1l1rarrant.-Where a judgment on bond and
warrant is, by mistake, entered for less than the sum specified in the latter,
it nlay be amended according thereto, on application of the plaintiff, at
any time, even after execution issued and the amount collected, saving,
however, the rights of third persons. Smith vs. Hood & Co. From
Greene Co.
Criminal Lazo-Accessory.-Though an accessory cannot be tried, he
may be indicted before the conviction or outlawry of the principal; - and,
unless it affirmatively appear upon the record of the conviction of an
accessory, that the principal has never been convicted or outlawed, the
judgment will not be reversed, as it must be presumed on error, that legal
proof of the fact was made before the jury. Andrew Bi. Holmes vs. The
Comm. From Fayette Co.
Courts- Criminal Law.-A Court of Quarter Sessions has jurisdiction
under the Act of 1836, of indictments for all crimes, &c., except those
which are enumerated in the Fifteenth Section of the Act, as within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Oyer and Terminer and general gaol
delivery; and hence of an indictment for being accessory to a burglary,
and receiving the stolen goods. ibid.
Criminal Law-Error.-In felonies not capital, it is to be presumed
on error that everything was rightly done at the trial, until the contrary
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appears. Hence, in such cases, a judgment will not be reversed, because
it does not affirmatively appear on the record that the defendant was
present at the rendition of the verdict. Ibid.
Ejectmnt-Trespass.-Trespass will not lie against a stranger who
removes personal property from land recovered in ejeetment, after judgment, but before entry or execution of a hab. fac., under a purchase from
the defendant. After A had recovered in action of ejectment against B,
but before actual possession taken, C, under a license from B, cut a
quantity of timber on the land, which A subsequently converted to his
own use, B recovered in two subsequent ejeetments. Jield, that C could
maintain trespass against A, for the timber. King & Shoenberger vs.
Baker. From Cambria Co.
E ,idence, Parol,to arTy lrlitten Contract. The plaintiff, in an action
of trespass, bad released to the defendant, a Plank Road Co., the right of
passage over the locus in quo, for the construction and use of the road.
The release was in writing, and in the usual form: eld, that parol
evidence was not admissible on his part, to show that the release was
signed by him, on the express condition that it was to be binding only
in case the road should be located on a particular route, and that it was
not so located. Kennedy vs. 7the Erie and Wattsburgh -P. R. Co. From
Erie Co.
.Excution-Exemption.-A defendant, in an execution levied on the
whole of a lot owned by him, gave notice of an intention to claim the
benefit of the exemption law. No sale was made on this writ. Afterwards
another execution was issued on another judgment, and a part only of the
lot was levied on. No notice was given in the latter case: .ield, on distribution of the proceeds, that the defendant had waived his right, and
that even if the same person were plaintiff in both levies, it would make
no difference. Dodson's Appeal. From Westmoreland Co.
Execution-Lien of Mortgage- When Discharged.-Wbere a mortgage
(other than one for purchase money,) and a judgment are entered up on
the same day, the mortgage is not a prior lien under the Act of 1830, but
will be discharged by a sale on a subsequent judgment. Xlfagaw vs.
Gavitt. From Mercer Co.
A purchaser at Sheriff's sale is not affected by anything which does
not appear on the record, and of which he has not notice. Hence, where
a mortgage and judgment were entered on the same day, and the latter
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appeared on the record to be unsatisfied at the time of a sale of the mortgaged property on a subsequent judgment, it was held that the purchaser
took discharged of the mortgage, though in point of fact the first judgment was actually paid, and the mortgage thus the first lien. Ibid.
Justice of the Feace-Appeal.-Underthe Act of March 20th, 1845, a
defendant is given a right of appeal from a judgment of a justice, or
award or referees, in addition to that given by the Act of 1814, only in
cases where, under the existing law, the plaintiff would have had the
right. Hence, where there is an award of referees for the plaintiff, for
less than twenty dollars, and the difference between its amount and that
claimed is also less than twenty dollars, the defendant cannot appeal.
Cook vs. Dunkle. From Clarion 0. P.
Landlord and Tenant-AyJportionment.-Where a railroad company,
having authority by law to take property for the purposes of the road,
purchases under that compulsion from a landlord, a portion of the demised premises, and then proceeds to evict the tenant therefrom, without
compensation, the tenant is not thereby discharged from the payment of
the whole rent, but the latter is apportioned from the moment the sale is
made. Linton vs. Hart. From Dist. Ct., Allegheny.
Limitations-Autual Accounts.-Where there have been mutual accounts between two persons within six years, the statute of limitations does
not apply to any portion of either account. It is not material that both
accounts are kept by one of the parties; and qu. whether it is necessary
that they should have been kept in writing at all. Though merely entering a credit in such case within six years, will not take all the account
out of the statute; yet if it be proved that the items of credit were actually
delivered on account, and credited agreeably to the defendant's request,
this exception to the statute applies. Chambers-vs. .Marks. From Westmoreland Co.
Limitations.-Within the period of the statute of limitations, the
widow of S. who had died in adverse possession of land, but with no other
title, and herself in possession, gave up the land to the legal owner, on
threat of being turned out by the sheriff. Held, that the continuance of
the adverse possession was interrupted, and that the heirs of S. could not
recover on a statutory title. Shaffer vs. Lowry. From Indiana Co.
Master and Servant-Clerk.-A person employed as the Secretary of a
private corporation, at a fixed rate of compensation, cannot demand extra
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pay for services in that capacity which were not anticipated at the time of
his appointment, or which were not enumerated in the charter or by-laws.
The fair construction of his contract is, that he will do whatever his employers have occasion to employ him about. Carr vs. Ohartiers Coal Co.
Allegheny Co.
Partnershkp-Lienof Partner.-Articles of copartnership in the lumber business, charged all the avails or proceeds of the business with the
payment of advances made by any of the partners. A. became a partner
in the business on the basis of these articles, and the partnership being
subsequently dissolved, he remained in possession of the saw mill and certain lumber in the raw state. Held, that he had a lien on the lumber for
his advances, and his expenses in preparing it for market, and was
entitled to retain it therefor as against the purchaser of the interest of
another partner, which was less that the amount of A's claim. Hall vs.
Ilyde. From Elk Co.
f-eld also, that A. might then claim credit for advances actually made,
but which, by mistake, had not been included in a previous settlement
with his former partners. Ibid.
Partncrship-Judgment.-Onthe distribution of the proceeds of a
sheriff's sale of partnership property, the holder of a judgment nominally
against only one of the partners, may show that it was in fact founded on
a partnership debt, and thus entitle it to rank with judgments against the
partnership. ilaus vs. The Comm. From Fayette Co.
The test of a partnership debt is whether one of the partners could have
paid it, and then claimed a credit therefor in the partnership accounts.
Therefore, where debts are incurred by one in carrying on business alone,
and he afterwards enters into a partnership, and it is stipulated at the
time that those debts shall be paid by the firm, they become partnership
debts. Ibid.
.Practice-Interpleadcr.-Thecommon law process of interpleader, has
never been abolished in Pennsylvania.
Practice thereunder stated.
Brownfield vs. Carron. From Fayette Co.
Where, though the defendant has taken issue on the plaintiff's claim, the
garnishee chooses to come in voluntarily, and make himself a party, and is
accepted as such, and a judgment is given against him, he cannot afterwards object to the irregularity. ibid.
Though in general on a recovery by the plaintiff, the judgment ought
to be against the defendant for the debt or thing claimed, and against the
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garnishee or party intervening for the damages and costs, yet where the
defendant has paid or transferred to the garnishee the debt or thing
claimed pending suit, the latter cannot complain of a judgment against
him for the whole. Ibid.
.Practice-Proofof lost record- Case stated.-A case was stated for
the opinion of the court, and afterwards lost. The court 'referred it to a
commissioner to take testimony as to its contents, and gave judgment on
his report. Held, entirely irregular, and judgment reversed for that reason. Cook vs. Shrouder. From Allegheny Co.
Sale of Chattcs- When Properlypasses.-- Where the parties to a contract of sale of personal property had agreed upon the terms, and the
mode of ascertaining the weight of the article, and part of the price had
been paid without delivery; but the agreed means of weighing afterwards
failed, and the vendor refused to adopt any other means, it was held that
the property had not passed. Nesbit vs. Barry. From Lawrence Co.
Set off-Partner.-Oneof two partners assigned a debt due to him in
his individual right, by one who was also a creditor of the firm, to a separate creditor, in satisfaction of his debt. A suit being brought in the name
of the former, and the other partner dying after plea, the defendant pleaded
as a set-off; the partnership debt. Held, that though by the death of one
of the partners, the debts became mutual, yet the previous appropriation
of the separate debt to the separate creditor, was a bar to the set-off.
lker vs. Eyth. From Butler Co.
Tax Sale.-A mere intruder cannot set up any objection to the validity
of a tax sale, on the ground of irregularities therein, however gross.
Query, if he could even take advantage of the fact of the actual payment of
the taxes by the original owner before sale, as against a purchaser without
notice. Cram vs. Burke. From Cambria Co.
The payment of the taxes on a portion of the land, by a stranger without
title, in such case, the whole of the land having been sold, held not to be
available on the part of a subsequent intruder to defeat a tax title. Ibid.
Will- Devise- Presumption.of life of devisee.-As against parties
claiming under a will, a devise therein to a particular person by name, is
2ima facie evidence of the existence of such person at the date of the
will, unless there are expressions in the instrument which throw a doubt
on the question. Crow vs. Kightlinger. From Indiana Co.
Will-Devise to a class.-Devise that certain land "shall be equally
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divided among R's children, he and they enjoying the benefits of it while
he lives." Held, that all of R's children living at his death, and not
merely those living at the death of the testator, were entitled. Huskins
vs. Tate. From Fayette Co.

Supreme Court of Texas, 1854--1855.1
ConstitutionalLaw- Crininal Law-Where one count in an indictment embraces two offences of different grades, a conviction of the inferior
offence is an acquittal of the higher, and ujon a new trial, the defendant
cannot be tried and convicted of the higher offence. Jones and Jones vs.
The State.
Criminal Law-Slaves.-Slaves are persons within the meaning of the
statute concerning crimes; and where not otherwise provided, or where
the relations arising out of the institution of slavery do not imply the
reverse, the statutes enacted for the punishment of crimes, and especially
crimes committed by violence to the person, apply equally to crimes committed by, or upon the person of a slave. (Chandler vs. The State, 2 Tex.
R. '05.) .Nix vs. The State.
Damages.-The measure of damages on breach of a contract to deliver
chattels, where the purchase money has been paid, is the highest price at
any time between the time appointed for delivery and the day of trial, and
interest from the time appointed for delivery. Calvit vs. M1cFadden.
Damages-Principaland Agent.-Where one collects money for another
and refuses to pay it over, the jury may allow damages for the detention,
and the measure of damages in such cases is the lawful rate of interest.
Close vs. P ields.
Evidence- .ractzce.-It is always a question addressed to the discretion of the Court, to determine whether the basis has been laid by proving
the loss or destruction of a record, to let in parol proof that such record
once did exist. This discretion is not an arbitrary, capricious discretion,
but must be a reasonable conclusion from the evidence. But, unless the
Court in error were fully satisfied from the evidence, that the Court below
erred in the exercise of its discretion, they would not be authorized to
reverse its decision.
olos vs. Moore.
' Volume 13 of Texas Reports.
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lnjunction.-An injunction will not be refused merely because the
defendant is in possession under an adverse claim of title. Burnley vs.
Cook.
The ancient practice of the Court of Chancery was, not to intefere by
injunction in cases of trespass, but to leave the party to his legal remedy.
But the practice of the court is now more liberal; and in cases of trespass,
it excepts a strong case of destruction or irreparable mischief.
lnterest.-Where a promise to pay money is not dated, and no time is
fixed for payment, interest runs from the date of the delivery. Van .rorman vs. 11 heeler.
Judgment of another State.-Where in the record of a judgment of a
court of another State, a capias ad reslondendum had been issued for the
defendant, and was returned "executed personally," it was held to be
sufficient prim'a facie, to show jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
Reid vs. Boyd.
If the transcript of a judgment of a court of record of another State is
properly certified, and it appear therefrom, however informally, that the
Court had jurisdiction of the persons of the parties and of the subject matter, and rendered judgment therein, the transcript entitles the plaintiff,
primafacie, to a ree6very. -Houston vs. Dunn.
Jurisdiction.-The acts of the 'Iexican authorities in the territory
adjacent to the Rio Grande, while that territory remained defacto under their
control, although subsequent to the declaration of her boundary by the
Republic of Texas, in the ordinary administration of the laws and municipal affairs, so far as individuals were concerned, were as valid and binding
as if done by the government de jure as well as de facto. Trevino vs.
.Fernandez.
Lands.-The words cccenso al quitar" in a composition grant do not
signify that a tenancy at will only is thereby conveyed, as translated in
White's Recopilacion, (2 vol. p. 53,) but that the land is conveyed subject
to an annuity or ground rent, redeemable at the will of the grantee.
Ibid.
The media annatawere not the rents payable half yearly, as suggested
in the case of .Afciullin vs Hodge, but the half of the estimated income or
rent for the first year; and they were chargeable not only on composition,
but on all grants, titles and offices whatever. ibid.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Limitation-Accounts between merchant and merchant.-The exception
in the statute of limitations, as to the accounts between merchant and
merchant, includes only accounts current, where there are various charges
and credits on each side, and not accounts which consist entirely of charges
on one side and payments on the other. Judd vs. Sampson & Co.
Limitation-Judgmentof a sister Stat.-A

judgment of a Court of

record of a sister State is barrable only by the space of time which would
cut off suit on a domestic judgment, viz: ten years.

Clay vs. Clay.

Limitation-ForeignJudynient.-It seems that an action on a foreign
judgment, not being a judgment of one of the United States, will be
barred in four years. Reid vs. Boyd.
.ractice-Law and Equitz.-The general rule, where law and equity
are administered in separate forums, is that damages must be sought at
law, and specific performance in equity. But this has no proper application, where the jurisdictions are blended, and where, therefore, both
objects may be embraced in the same suit, and where consequently, the
prayer may be in the alternative, and where, if one relief fails, the other
may be awarded, if, on the principles of law or equity, either the one or
the other can be granted.

Mitchell vs. Sheppard.

Practicc-Commnon Law.-The rules of the common law have never
been considered obligatory, as matters of absolute principle, on questions
of practice; but our courts have either adhered to their former practice,
or have adopted such rules of their own, as seemed dictated by considerations of policy and convenience, rather then pursue the common law
practice, where the rule which it afforded was found to be unsuited to our
system, or inconvenient of application.
Grassmeyer vs. Beeson.
Witness -Interest
is no objection to the competency of a witness to
testify in a matter involving a question of practice addressed to the discretion of the court.

Gillespie vs. Redmond.
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